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Abstract: This article investigates how discourses on open networking technologies provide a 
social imaginary that industry and government actors mobilize in an attempt to expand their 
control over mobile telecommunications networks. The case of recent initiatives aiming to “open 
up” radio access network (or RAN, a key component of telecommunications infrastructure) with 
an “open RAN” model reveals how the US Government came to promote this nascent 
technology to create an opposition between its own “open” telecommunications networks versus 
proprietary and presumed “untrustworthy” networks based on foreign equipment, namely 
Huawei. While a closer look casts doubts on the benefits of open RAN to increase network 
security or to open up the equipment market, this case reveals how openness is an ambiguous 
notion that can be used by governments to exclude foreign trade enemies while advocating for 
trust in telecommunications networks.  
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On May 15, 2019, then President Trump issued an executive order banning the use on the US 
territory of telecommunications equipment from foreign firms suspected of constituting a 
national security risk, predominantly targeting Huawei. The US government has in parallel been 
campaigning for its allies to similarly ban the company from their national networks, with 
success among the “Five Eyes” countries (Australia, Canada, UK, New Zealand, and US), while 
various EU countries are adopting similar measures. These restrictions have direct consequences 
for future telecommunications networks as they force telecommunications operators to choose 
different manufacturers to purchase the networking equipment necessary to roll out their future 
infrastructure, especially fifth generation networks (5G). Additionally, these measures have a 
dramatic impact on existing infrastructure, as they also require operators to remove targeted 
equipment from current technological configurations. As Huawei components are widely used in 
current networks, a ban on this manufacturer means that the concerned telecom operators have to 
conduct large “rip and replace” campaigns of Huawei gear from their existing networks.  
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This obligation to replace Huawei components from existing networks has brought the question 
of alternative network equipment suppliers. In addition to considering the existing competitors to 
Huawei (such as the European equipment suppliers Nokia or Ericsson), operators and regulators 
in countries banning suspected equipment have been investigating whether open solutions could 
constitute a viable replacement of proprietary technologies, focusing on the Radio Access 
Network (or RAN). Several initiatives promote an “open RAN” model (whose specifics will be 
explained in the next section) which would replace a closed architecture linking proprietary 
networking hardware and management software by an architecture based on open and modular 
interfaces, giving operators deeper control over which technologies they use and assemble. In 
2020, the US Government endorsed this model and put it at the centre of its strategy to exclude 
Huawei from its network.  
 
Instead of focusing on the networking or market performances of open RAN, this article analyses 
its openness as a discursive device mobilized by telecommunication industry or governmental 
actors to increase their economic and political power over networks. For the telecommunications 
industry, open RAN is tasked with bringing a competitive market with open standards 
unhindered by the bundled and proprietary technologies sold by a narrow set of leading 
manufacturers. For the US government, open RAN is an architectural model supposed to 
guarantee trust in network management and to replace untrustworthy foreign manufacturers. 
Analyzing open RAN as such engages with three critical perspectives on telecommunications 
networks and technologies. First, networks and their components—such as the RAN—are sites 
of political-economic struggle between various opposed stakeholders who want to increase their 
power, from transatlantic telegraph cables to contemporary internet (Hills 2002; Winseck and 
Pike 2007; Mattelart 2000). Within these macro-scales of power, Mansell builds on previous 
works on social imaginaries (Taylor 2018) to emphasize that communication technologies are a 
site of competition for divergent sets of programs and narratives (Mansell 2012). Open RAN 
proponents similarly position this technology as instantiating an imaginary of “openness” that 
they equate with “trust” or even “democracy” and position against “untrustworthy” and “black-
boxed” proprietary and foreign technologies. Finally, communication networks are constituted of 
series of standards, e.g. those constituting the RAN, whose design and selection reveal how 
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actors with competing interests include and exclude other actors from shaping the future of 
networks (Edwards 1996; Abbate 2000; Yates and Murphy 2019). Combining these three levels 
of analysis (networks, imaginaries, and standards) reveals how industry and government actors 
can elect one specific architecture (open RAN) to convey a particular social imaginary of 
freedom, to eventually promote their economic and political control over communication 
networks. 
 
Open RAN eventually shows how questions of trust in network governance evolves as 
networking infrastructure increases its reliance on software and modular architecture. First, as 
networks become increasingly “virtualized”—i.e. with key functions managed through cloud-
based software and not mainly through hardware—questions of trust in the network similarly 
move from hardware to software. Tellingly, open RAN brings the focus of “openness”—more 
prevalent in the software world (Coleman 2012; Kelty 2008)—to the world of 
telecommunication hardware. However, the polysemic nature of “openness” allows industry or 
government actors to mobilize this notion to promote their specific agenda. Second, networks 
increasingly adopt platform-based processes, making their architecture programmable via 
modules that are all compatible via shared application programming interfaces (APIs). This 
instance of platformization of infrastructure (Plantin et al, 2018) reformulates questions of trust 
in network governance: while in the past, the tight market control of a few legacy manufacturers 
was a guarantee of trust, this model is increasingly associated with a lack of transparency, slow 
innovation, and unfair market advantage. With the modular architecture of open RAN, trust is 
less attached to a specific actor and market advantage, but involves questions such as: which 
actor takes part in a modular architecture, who has access to which APIs, or whose actors acts as 
a gatekeeper to control access to interfaces? All these questions are already routinely asked to 
digital platforms in society (van Dijck, Poell, and Waal 2018; Gillespie 2010; Helmond 2015). 
Increasingly, as the case below illustrates, they will have to be applied to networking 
infrastructures.  
 
RAN and open RAN 
Radio Access Network (or RAN) is the segment of a telecommunication network that is located 
between the core network and users’ equipment (such as a mobile phone). In its typical form, for 
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example adopted for LTE or 4G networks, a RAN is constituted of a Radio Unit, which is the 
antenna visible on top of a cell tower, and a Baseband Unit, a set of devices linking the radio 
equipment to the core network. To put it simply, RAN is the series of components linking users’ 
cell phones to the network.  
 
While radio equipment is crucial to the deployment of telecommunications networks and users’ 
access to connectivity, it brings many challenges to mobile telecom operators, which motivates 
the search for alternative models. First, their cost is high: it is estimated that RAN can cost as 
much as 70 per cent of an operator’s capital expenditure (Fildes 2020). Second, the market for 
RAN equipment is currently divided between three companies (Huawei, Nokia, and Ericsson) 
who have a combined revenue market share of approximately 80% (Brown 2020). This oligopoly 
is criticized for keeping the prices of equipment high and the pace of innovation for RAN 
equipment slow, as these suppliers have small incentives to develop ground-breaking 
technologies that would disrupt their own market power. Finally, suppliers usually sell RAN as a 
bundled technology where hardware and software are closely aggregated and not 
interchangeable. For example, radio units, processing units, as well as the management software 
are sold as a bundle and operate together. While this increases reliability, this model is criticized 
by operators wanting to mix and match components from various manufacturers, hence selecting 
more recent or possibly cheaper components, and updating specific components one at the time 
instead of as a whole. In addition to all these constraints, the dramatic multiplication of antennas 
needed for 5G deployment has also incentivized operators to look for cheaper ways to 
manufacture and deploy RAN at scale.  
 
Open RAN “opens up” the traditional proprietary RAN by relying on generic hardware and open 
interfaces, allowing operators to choose their own combination of hardware and software. It aims 
to replace the traditional RAN model, which tightly bundles hardware and software in a 
monolithic architecture, by providing operators with an architecture based on two key principles: 
first, using open interfaces between the components of the RAN (Radio Units and Baseband 
Units) allows operators to choose the hardware and software to operate their radio, instead of 
being forced to use those already integrated; second, using open interfaces, and if possible 
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generic non-proprietary hardware, allows operators to choose, adapt, modify the technologies 
they want to use, as opposed to restrictive proprietary equipment. 
 
The open RAN model was created in 2016 in a working group from the industry consortium 
Telecom Infra Project (TIP), which brings together telecommunication operators and 
manufacturers (among others) to promote, as per the official website, “open, disaggregated, and 
standards-based technology solutions” in the field of telecommunications. TIP fosters an 
ecosystem of link-minded industry actors, compatibility between technologies, as well as live 
trials and deployments of open RAN technologies. Two standard bodies are involved in 
providing the specificiations for the open interfaces at the center of the open RAN model: 3GPP 
and the O-RAN Alliance. 3GPP has a much wider focus, but in the case of open RAN it provides 
a “split radio” model for 5G (3GPP Release-15) which disaggregates the various components of 
the RAN. O-RAN Alliance complements the 3GPP by defining 11 open interfaces allowing 
modularity between disaggregated components, for example between the RAN and the 
management system, or between the distributed unit and the central unit. 
 
While proponents of open RAN emphasize the disruptive, even revolutionary nature of openness 
applied to network equipment, the next section shows that such model mostly aims to apply the 
principle of modularity, which is already used in various segments of the IT supply chain (Gawer 
and Cusumano 2002; Baldwin and Clark 2000). Similarly, modular interfaces have already been 
widely discussed in the telecommunication industries with the rise of intelligent networks in the 
1990s (Mansell 1993), and their application is debated once again with the arrival of 5G. 
Replacing open RAN in this recent history of IT and telecommunications networks shows that 
operators use open modularity as an attempt to increase their control over the configuration of 
networking equipment they use to build their infrastructure. 
 
A New Battle for the Control of Open Interfaces  
The open RAN model in effect disaggregates the different parts of the radio access network and 
make them modular through open interfaces. With such a model, an operator can buy, for 
example, antenna equipment from one manufacturer and networking equipment from another, 
and components are still compatible as they share common open interfaces. Borrowing a concept 
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from management scholars, open RAN brings a modular architecture to radio equipment, in 
which “modules are units in a larger system that are structurally independent of one another, but 
work together” (Baldwin and Clark 2000, p. 63). Modularity is already amply used across the IT 
supply chain, with Intel, Microsoft or Cisco presented as successful early adopters of such 
“platform strategy” (Gawer and Cusumano 2002). A modular architecture facilitates the 
integration of different components and purportedly leads to higher specialization and faster 
innovation. A similar goal leads current experiments with radio equipment via open RAN.  
 
Beyond considerations of innovation, Russell links the concept of modularity to questions of 
control and power, and invites us to “critically examine modular discourse for insights on how 
system architects used modular concepts to order, coordinate, and control”(Russell 2012, p. 260). 
This perspective emphasizes that open RAN industry contenders present open RAN as an 
emancipatory technology that would allow them to break free from the limitations of the bundled 
approach of network hardware manufacturers. Open RAN advocates claim that the open RAN 
model will, for example, “open the network stack and enhance vendor competition” (Wang, Roy, 
and Kelly 2019, p. 5); similarly, “Open interfaces allows a new freedom – the use of one 
supplier’s radios with another’s processors” (Mavenir nd). This open model—and the freedom it 
is supposed to afford—is presented in opposition to the existing model of procurement, where 
customers are “held hostage to big company development timelines […]” as it favours 
“integrated products under their exclusive control” eventually leaving network operators unable 
“to gain control over RAN equipment due to proprietary interfaces and licensing restrictions” 
(Brown 2020, p. 3). For open RAN advocates, modularity and openness are emancipatory 
notions that will lead operators to regain control of their own infrastructure. 
 
Replacing these debates in the recent history of telecommunication reveals that network 
operators have not waited for the arrival of 5G networks to try to break free from manufacturers. 
Calls for modularity were already voiced in the telecom sector in the 1990s and with the rise of 
“intelligent networks,” when databases and software were increasingly used to expand and 
manage telecommunications networks (Mansell 1993). Such change of architecture brought the 
question of open interfaces, which would allow “access by competing service suppliers to the 
unbundled intelligent functionality within the public telecommunication network” (Mansell 
 7 
1993, p. 37). Looking at current debates on RAN in this historical perspective reveals that 
modular architecture and open standards is consistently presented as the solution against an 
oligopolistic market and tight control on procurement through proprietary technologies.  
 
Network operators leverages the open RAN model—revolving around modularity and 
openness—in a bid to bypass existing component manufacturers and to gain deeper control over 
which components they choose to assemble in their RAN. Before critically examining the reality 
of such claims in the last two sections, the next part reveals how the principle of openness was 
also employed by the Trump administration, albeit for a different goal: to break free from the 
Chinese equipment manufacturer Huawei.  
 
The Geopolitical Hijacking of Open RAN 
In 2020, open RAN unexpectedly left the highly specific industry debates around radio 
equipment to enter the geopolitical arena. In addition to banning Huawei equipment from current 
and future networks, the Trump administration concurrently brought open RAN to the center of 
its strategy for secure networks. While in the networking industry, “openness” is used by its 
proponents to call for increased competition and innovation via open interfaces, the Trump 
administration used the same term to oppose the trust and transparency of “open” equipment 
from allied countries to black-boxed and untrustworthy foreign gear. Some commentators have 
summarized such politicization of the technology as the “hijacking of open RAN” by the 
previous US Government, with the objectives not being “about cost savings, competition or even 
openness,” but “about shutting out the Chinese” (Morris 2020a). 
 
The interest of the US government in open RAN rapidly increased in 2020 through key 
milestones. First, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) now directly subsidizes 
the development and future deployment of open RAN in actual networks. On April 24, 2020, the 
US Senate passed the bipartisan legislation Utilizing Strategic Allied (USA) Telecommunications 
Act, which requires the FCC to create a $750M grant scheme to create a research & development 
fund dedicated to open RAN (Warner, 2020). In addition to this grant scheme, the Act would 
create a “transition plan” to facilitate the purchase of open RAN-compatible equipment 
especially by small and rural carriers.  
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Second, the FCC held on September 14, 2020, a day-long event entitled “Forum on 5G Open 
Radio Access Networks” which brought together telecom operators (AT&T, Jio), equipment 
manufacturers (IBM, Nokia), members of the open RAN community (Open RAN Policy 
Coalition), and various legislators to assess the needs of the telecom community and the capacity 
of open RAN to fulfil them. In his introductory address, then FCC Chairman Ajit Pai lauded 
open RAN as providing “an exponential growth in the number and diversity of suppliers [and] 
more cost-effective solutions” (Pai 2020). The geopolitical dimension of the technology was not 
forgotten, as Pai also enthusiastically claimed that open RAN puts “the keys to security in the 
hands of network operators, as opposed to a Chinese vendor” but also that key open RAN 
companies—such as the solution providers Altiostar, Mavenir, or Parallel Wireless— are US-
based companies.  
 
Finally, the open RAN community saw the creation of a new policy body in 2020, the Open RAN 
Policy Coalition, which is independent from the FCC and US government but whose goals align 
directly with them. While the open RAN community was so far structured around dedicated 
standardization bodies (O-RAN Alliance) or industry consortia to accelerate real-world 
deployment (Telecom Infra Project), the Open RAN Policy Coalition constitutes the clearest 
form of political lobbying for open RAN. The fact that its membership is constituted exclusively 
of US members or allied countries (such as Japan, Korea, or UK) and without Chinese telecom 
or manufacturers led commentators to present this consortium as mostly promoting a US-based 
version of open RAN independent from China. It was similarly reported that this organization 
has lobbied the UK government to exclude Huawei from its national infrastructure (Fildes, 
2020). 
 
This promotion of open RAN technologies by the FCC and policy bodies directly meets the goal 
of the “Clean Network,” a bi-partisan program spearheaded by then Secretary of State Michael 
Pompeo (who gave an opening talk during the FCC forum on open RAN). It explicitly aims to 
protect US and allied countries from “aggressive intrusions by malign actors, such as the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP)” (Pompeo, 2020). The program has produced a series of 
recommendations, such as the “Prague proposals” (Government of the Czech Republic 2019) 
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and a checklist to determine trustworthiness and security in network, the “Criteria for Security 
and Trust in Telecommunications Networks and Services” (CSIS 2020).  
 
These guidelines reveal how the discourse of open RAN—promoting openness, transparency, 
and modularity—is extracted from the industry context and used in the geopolitical arena to 
support the political campaign of the US against China. The “Prague proposals,” written by 
experts from EU and NATO states at the Prague 5G Security Conference on May 2019, presents 
the following principles for the roll out of 5G: using “international, open, consensus-based 
standards” (Government of the Czech Republic 2019, p. 3), advocating for “transparency and 
equitability, taking into account the global economy and interoperable rules ”(ibid., p. 3), and 
relying on a “diverse and vibrant communications equipment market and supply chain [which] 
are essential for security and economic resilience” (ibid., p. 4). Such desire to provide a 
community-based standard that promotes transparent procurement and open interfaces between 
actors directly echoes the key characteristics of open RAN, and are presented here as the 
desirable model for technology development.  
 
Conversely, the transparency of open networking equipment is presented as opposed to the 
opaqueness of other providers’ practices, with Chinese manufacturers in mind. The checklist 
“Criteria for Security and Trust in Telecommunications Networks and Services” published in 
May 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as part of the “Clean 
Network” initiative defines “Opaqueness [as] indicated by unusual ownership arrangements that 
disguise who owns, controls, or influences the supplier company or use any other mechanisms to 
conceal dependencies between the supplier and a foreign state” (CSIS, 2020, p.16). As opposed 
to “transparent” networks, “opaque” technology would allow access by the Chinese government 
to the 5G infrastructure once installed in foreign countries. Opaqueness similarly concerns the 
financial structure of network equipment providers, encompassing “opaque financial support or 
incentives, subsidies, or other financing mechanisms that are not commercially reasonable; lack 
of transparency; are part of a larger effort involving predatory pricing intended to eliminate 
competition; force other suppliers from the market; or are part of other government actions 
intended to disadvantage competitors unfairly” (CSIS, 2020, p. 17). As often repeated during the 
FCC forum on open RAN, Huawei components are considered by its opponents as subsidized by 
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the Chinese Communist Party, thereby presumably skewing the competition and allowing the 
company to expand its market presence through low prices (especially in countries with high 
infrastructure costs, such as Africa, cf. Tang 2020, p. 4563). This directly contrasts with claims 
made about open RAN, which is presented by its proponents as creating a transparent market 
where all players would be equal and able to compete.  
 
As shown in the last two sections, the term “openness” possesses the strategic polysemy that 
allows different actors to use it to push for different agenda. This term is part of a social 
imaginary that can travel across national sociopolitical contexts and communities of practice 
(Mager, 2018; Mansell, 2012) to serve specific interests. In the networking industry, it is used to 
promote competition and innovation through open interfaces and modular architecture. In the 
geopolitical context, it is endorsed by the US administration to carry values of freedom, 
transparency, and democracy. In the next section, we extract open RAN from partisan debates 
and assess the reality of its assets, and look next at the position of the EU on open RAN and 
network governance.  
 
The Benefits of Open RAN in Question 
The ambiguity around the use of the term “openness” to promote open RAN is twofold: on the 
one hand, open RAN is tasked with opening up the equipement market to competitive entry. 
Relying on open and modular interfaces is supposed to give room for new suppliers, hereby 
decreasing the influence of the three leading companies. On the other hand, open RAN is 
presented as opening up the proprietary RAN technologies by allowing operators to mix and max 
the hardware and software they purchase from different vendors. However, despite this 
ambitious program, many critiques have voiced their concerns regarding the capacity of open 
RAN to fulfil these two goals.  
 
Regarding the ability of open RAN to open up the vendors’ market, two elements of caution are 
important. First, leading vendors, primarily Nokia and Ericsson, are currently increasing their 
participation in open RAN, either through participation to consortia (both are members of the O-
RAN Alliance, Nokia of TIP as well), or through direct development (Nokia announced on July 
7, 2020, the release of O-RAN-defined interfaces expected in 2021, cf. Nokia 2020). This 
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involvement in such a nascent model can be interpretated as a cautious investment in the future, 
should the open RAN model take off, but similarly calls into question the capacity of this new 
model to radically open up competition in the vendor market if the leading manufacters that it is 
supposed to displace are already involved in the technology design.  
 
Second, open RAN can provide an opportunity for tech giants—such as Facebook, Google, 
Amazon, or Microsoft—to increase their control over network infrastructure through their cloud 
capacities, something that telecommunications operators are wary of letting happen (Lee-
Makiyama and Hosuk 2020). By disaggregating hardware from software, open RAN allows the 
“virtualization” of network functions, as they can be performed via the cloud rather than 
hardware on premise. While this model allows for a more efficient network management, it also 
offers an opportunity for the tech giants—currently leading the cloud market with Microsoft 
Azure, Google Cloud, or Amazon Web Service —to become an important infrastructural 
component of the networking infrastructure (Van Dijck et al., 2018; Plantin et al., 2018). 
Moreover, by making access technologies more easily available to industry newcomers, open 
RAN similarly meet existing initiatives from tech companies to increase global connectivity (for 
example Facebook Connectivity, which hosts the widely discussed Free Basics initiative). The 
presence of tech giants in several open RAN consortia (Facebook is a founding member of the 
Telecom Infra Project, and Facebook, Google and Microsoft are part of Open RAN Policy 
Coalition) also reveals their interest in this trend. Interestingly, the endorsement of open RAN by 
tech giants goes against their common strategy to expand their market power by promoting 
intraoperable systems—i.e. the vertically integrated proprietary platforms that Google, for 
example, promotes in primary education (Kerssens & van Dijck, 2021). Here, tech giants favor 
the interoperability that open RAN brings between components, against the intraoperability 
promoted by legacy suppliers. Open RAN therefore brings the risk for network operators of 
swapping one dependence for another one: either towards legacy vendors in the proprietary RAN 
model, or towards large tech companies in the open RAN model.  
 
A different set of critiques has targeted the capacity of open RAN to open up the proprietary 
RAN technologies. First of all, open RAN is not in itself an open source technology, rather it 
provides a series of open interfaces that allows the connection of various components (e.g. 
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antenna and processing unit). However, while the interfaces are open and negotiated through 
standardization bodies, the components linked together to constitute the RAN can remain 
proprietary. Moreover, open interfaces have raised security concerns. A recent report from 
Ericsson emphasizes that the multiplication of open interfaces with open RAN dramatically 
expands the “threat surface” for potential cyberattacks (Boswell and Poretsky 2020). The report 
generated some pushback from open RAN advocates, who contended that Ericsson has a vested 
interest in undermining this competing model, and that openness of the technology is the best 
guarantee to continuously monitor network security (Nolle 2020).  
 
Most importantly, the US strategy of promoting open RAN to reduce the role of Chinese 
manufacturers in the building of the 5G infrastructure is a fallacy. Beyond Huawei, other 
Chinese companies have already been massively involved in the design of open RAN 
specifications. With 44 companies from Mainland China (and 3 from Hong Kong), China has the 
second-largest number of members in the O-RAN alliance (after the US, with 82 members, and 
before Taiwan, with 20 members). Similarly, the standard body 3GPP has 131 Chinese 
companies (and 2 from Hong Kong) and over 688 individual members, as of early 2021. As 
some commentators put it: if the goal of the Chinese state is to influence the future of telecom 
technologies, then it is already doing this via open RAN, without needing Huawei (Strand, 
2020). The effort of the US to exclude Chinese companies from open RAN (most notably by 
setting a dedicated policy body excluding Chinese companies—the Open RAN Policy Coalition, 
mentioned earlier) does not reflect the already important part that Chinese manufacturers play in 
shaping open RAN. It also runs the risk of artificially multiplying efforts between a purported 
“China-free” open RAN, and an open RAN including Chinese companies, both following the 
same architectural principles.  
 
Finally, additional commentators mention that despite such a momentum in industry or 
government settings, the open RAN model is still in its early rollout and is not mature yet. While 
the key actors of open RAN, either consortia such as the Telecom Infra Project or companies like 
Rakuten, generate significant media coverage retrospectively for early deployment in Turkey and 
in Japan, others contend that it will take some time before the real costs and benefits of 
deployment are visible (Fildes, 2020). The economic gains of replacing a proprietary model by 
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an open model is uncertain, as the costs of integration for open and disaggregated solutions 
would for some offset the gains resulting from skipping the expensive traditional equipment 
providers (Townsend 2020). Moreover, even if the use of open RAN becomes more generalized 
across the industry, the market penetration is presented as low, with a limited impact of 10% of 
the market by 2025 (Kapko 2020). Finally, some commentators emphasize that open RAN is not 
in a position to compete with the main equipment manufacturers, such as Huawei, Nokia and 
Ericsson, which will most likely keep their market power in a near future (Fildes, 2020), 
especially if they strategically invest in open RAN initiatives.  
 
Despite the ambitious benefits it is supposed to bring—opening up the market to newcomers, 
making technology more transparent and more trustworthy—many commentators express doubts 
over open RAN. The model is therefore currently characterized by a paradox between, on the 
one hand, the important limitations highlighted above, and on the other hand, the strong support 
from the Trump administration in an attempt to quickly find an alternative to Huawei as 5G 
equipment supplier. While the Biden administration has not yet taken a specific position on open 
RAN, the Utilizing Strategic Allied (USA) Telecommunications Act passed in 2020 was as a 
bipartisan legislation, hence supported by the Democrats. The new FCC chairwoman, Jessica 
Rosenworcel, is also presented as a supporter of open RAN (Baldock, 2021). 
 
The EU position on 5G and Open RAN 
In this context, Europe is more cautious in its position towards open RAN. On the one hand, 
several EU countries are increasingly taking measures against Huawei, leading commentators to 
state that “Europe is showing Huawei the exit” (Morris 2020b). At the time of writing, the UK, 
France, Germany, Italy, and Poland have implemented various restrictions towards Huawei, 
ranging from a complete ban to a new approval process to the non-renewal of licenses. On the 
other hand, the European Union emphasizes the question of security for 5G networks by 
promoting a concerted approach within EU members, at the opposite of the US unilateral 
measures to ban or promote one specific technology. This is evidenced by a series of 
recommendations concerning 5G. First, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) 
published in November 2019 a “toolbox” providing a detailed assessment of the 58 major threats 
of the 5G infrastructure (Lourenço and Marinos 2019)—which does not focus on Huawei 
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specifically, but try to assess the general threat landscape for future 5G networks. It was 
followed in July 2020 by a report from the same agency on the progress of EU member states’ 
actions against the risks highlighted in the 2019 report (NIS Cooperation Group 2020). These 
two documents signal RAN as a key point of failure of national networks and call for the 
diversification of suppliers in order to prevent over-reliance on high-risks suppliers (Ibid., p. 42). 
As opposed to similar US policy guidelines, however, these documents do not mention nor 
promote open RAN as a specific solution for safer networks.  
 
Additionally, the position of the EU differs from the US as it is the home of the two other world 
leading equipment manufacturers (Ericsson and Nokia), while the US does not similarly possess 
a national supplier. The readiness of these two European market leaders to jump in and replace 
Huawei gear creates less of an incentive for the European Union to quickly find alternative 
suppliers and models for procurement, especially since Nokia an Ericsson are contributing to the 
early design of open RAN. Moreover, the EU industrial policy favors open competition between 
various standards without direct intervention through state subsidies and national mandates 
(which, ironically enough, is the strategy adopted by both China with Huawei and the US with 
open RAN). It is therefore unlikely that the EU will directly intervene to promote open RAN 
over other radio access solutions.1 For all these reasons, commentators claim that “Open RAN 
will have a limited impact on EU deployment of 5G” (Lee-Makiyama and Hosuk 2020, p. 16). 
 
Conclusion 
Considering open RAN less for its technological and economic value and more as conveying a 
social imaginary revolving around openness and transparency shows how different actors 
mobilize this architecture and its associated standards—however recent and barely tested—in 
their attempts to gain control over mobile telecommunications networks. For network operators, 
openness is purported to bring the modularity and flexibility necessary to unleash innovation and 
to break free from the proprietary control of leading suppliers; for the past US Administration, 
 
1 Financial support can still come from individual EU member states. The German government included €2 million 
funding for open RAN research and development as part its post-COVID stimulus package of €130 billion 
announced in June 2020 (le Maistre, 2021). 
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openness was touted as guarantee of trust and transparency in its attempts to swiftly replace 
Huawei by alternative suppliers of networking equipment.  
 
Critiques of open RAN show, however, that neither assumption is supported by evidence: the 
history of telecommunications networks reveals a pattern of recurrent calls for modular and open 
interfaces in the telecom spaces, none of which managed to overthrow the monopoly of 
manufacturers. Similarly, open RAN is not “open” for everyone, as legacy companies are already 
investing in the technology, and tech giants are also strong supporters. Finally, the security gains 
of open RAN are still contested, and so are the financial gains. Open RAN is therefore less 
relevant for its purported goals of increasing innovation and security, but rather for revealing 
how the same principle of openness can be mobilized by various actors in their attempts to gain 
control over mobile telecommunications networks. New models need to be designed to adapt 
traditional institutional governance to how platforms shape public discourse—a debate to which 
this special issue contributes in multiple ways (also cf. Van Dijck, this issue). In this context, this 
article acts as a cautionary tale. An imaginary of openness and trustworthiness can easily be 
weaponized by industry and government actors to push for their specific agendas. As shown, the 
discourse about open standards, modularity and interoperability circulates from industry to 
government and becomes included into geopolitical debates. In a context of increasing 
virtualization and platformization of communication networks, further migration of the concept 
of trust—and its related ambiguity in terms of governance—is to be expected as software and the 
open source model are increasingly integrated into the architecture of communications networks.  
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